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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
COMBINED METALS REDUCTION COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Resp,ondent,

vs.
TOOELE COUNTY, a Body Corporate and Politic of the State of
Utah, and PHARES HAYNES as
'rreasurer of TOOELE COUNTY,
UTAH,
Defendants and AppeUants.

Case
No. 6907

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent's position is that there is no question of
fact in dispute in this case. However, should appellants
point out any essential fact alleged by respondent and
denied by appellant, and necessary to the determination
of the question herejn involved, respondent will concede
thlt the judgment should be reversed and the case sent
1

back for determination of such fact.
With changes in the figures and slight modification
otherwise, we therefore paraphrase and adopt the statement of facts on which the Montana court in the case of
Klies v Linnane (156 p. 2d 183, Feb. 26, 1945) based its
decision:
During the year 1943 plaintiff (respondent) produced ore containing specified amounts of gold, silver,
copper, lead and zinc which it sold on the open market
to purchasers other than the United States Government
for $390,679.96; in addition to that ~amount so received
by it from the sale of said metals the Government of the
United States, acting through the Metals Reserve Corporation (company), paid to respondent as a premium or
bonus for the copper, lead and zinc so produced by it the
sum of $272,150.86 for the purpose of encouraging the
production of said metals over and above established
quotas; respondent was entitled to deduct certain costs
for expense totaling $501,888.44.
Based upon such statement of facts, the court then
states the question for consideration:
If the premium or bonus received from the Government was not properly included as part of the gross value
of the metals for the purpose of computing the net proceeds tax thereon, the deductions exceeded the value and
no tax was payable; but if the premium or bonus was
properly included for that purpose, a tax of $2,832.59
(our figure) was due and payable, in which event the
judgment herein for the recovery of the payment should
be reversed.
2

Appellant's brief poses the same question as that
shortly stated by the Supreme Court of Montana. See
statement of facts, assignment of error, and points relied upon, pp. 1-8. Proceeding with its argument it
quotes the provisions of our constitution, and we need
not repeat them, pp. 8-10. It then takes up our statutory
pr-ovisions and quotes Sec. 80-5-3 U. C.A. 1943 (which
our Legislature failed to amend by changing the word
three to two), and Section 80-5-57 defining ''net annual
proceeds,'' italicizing ••gross pr-oceeds realized during
the preceding calendar year from the sale or conversion
into money or its equivalent of all ores from such mine or
mining claim cxtra.cted" and devotes the rest of the brief
to an effort to show that these words do not mean what
they say. It cites (p. 12) the case of Salt Lake County
v Utah Copper Company, 93 Fed. 2d 127, which obviously
did not deal with the question in the case at bar, but does
have in it something of value for the determination of
this case, and they quote it, "All words of a law must
have effect, rather than that part should perish by construction." It also at p. 13 attempts to differentiate the
yard stick set in the Occupation Tax statute from that
used in the Net Proceeds Tax statute. At p. 15 it calls
attention to two criminal cases in which it was held that
ceiling prices did not fix value for such purpose but that
opinion evidence was admissable to determine the degree
of crime. At p. 16 it calls attention to the early case of
Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Co. v Spry, 16 Utah 222,
52 Pac. 382, and says the doctrine has never been departed from (with which we agree) but overlooks the
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earlier case of State v Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 50 Pac. 615,
which lays down the rule (syl. 1)"Under Sections 2 and 3, Art. 13, Const., all
taxable property within this state must be assessed and taxed on a valuation fixed at its actual
cash value, or as near such value as is reasonably
practicable. The test of such value is the cash
price for which the property valued would sell
in open market.''
Then follows citation and comments on some cases
involving "gross," "gross income''' and "gross premiums,'' but since respondent admits the receipt of subsidy payments constituted part of its gross income, WE'
see no point in these.
Turning then to the bottom of page 18, appellants
say respondent will (and respondent does) admit that the
Federal Government through Metals Reserve Company
paid the premium prices to the producers in order to
obtain increased production of the ores involved, which
increased production the Government needed to prosecute the war. And that "The Government through the
metals prices, paid only for what it got." Following
that part of the argument further, we are inclined to
admit that during the year 1943, the Government saved
$147,663,900.00; that is to say, the producers got thai
much less for their production than they would have received except for the Government program.
Then we find some more income tax cases, pp. 2123, and come to appellant's effort (pp. 24-25) to distinguish Klies v Linnane, 156 P. 2d 183, from the case at
bar. At page 27 appellants suggest that respondent
4

should consent to the elimination of "these added costs
of producing the ore from their claimed expense deduction.''
Throughout there are interspersed appellant's arguments and comments, all, as it seems to us, built upon
faulty premises.

I.

WERE THE PREMIUM OR BONUS (SUBSIDY) PAYMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE GOVERNMENT PROPERLY INCLUDED AS PART
OF THE GROSS VALUE OF THE METALS FOR
THE PURPOSE OF COMPUTING THE NET
PROCEEDS THEREON?
Appellant's whole theory appears to rest upon two
propositions!. That Klies v. Linnane is not an authority for
the reason that, as they seem to think, there is
a distinction between the Montana and the Utah
statutes;
2. That due to the war and the measures taken by
the United States Government for our national
saefty, there was not a free and open, but a
controlled, market; therefore, although the Utah
statutory measuring stick is obviously based on
bona fide sales of ore production, sales of ore
made by the producers were not sales, but some
indefinite and ind(~finable something else.
\Ve think their argument ingenious, but unsound.
The question is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. Decisions contrary to appellant's position have
been reached by the United States District Court for the
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District of Utah under the Occupation Tax statute and
under the Net Proceeds Tax statute (cases pending on
appeals); by two of our own district court judges-Judge
Bronson in the Occupation Tax case now pending in this
court, and Judge Henderson, in this case, and by the
Montana Supreme Court in the Klies v. Linnane case.
It is not claimed that any such decision is binding on this
court; we do urge they should be persuasive.
Appellants s,ay that the Montana case is not supported by any authority; certainly appellants have cited
no authority that condemns it. An effort is made to distinguish it on the ground that our statute is not the same
as the Montana statute. The statutes are not the same,
but the difference does not make for the distinction
appellants claim.
Appellants' comment on Sec. 2090.4 of the Montana
Code (p. 24 of its brief) is, inadvertently misleading.
We quote the section in full as follows:
"2090.4 FALSE OR FRAUDULBNT REPORTR,
PROCEDURE IN CASE OF.
If any such report required by this chapter contains
any wilfully false or fraudulent statements as to the
gross amount received by any person, corporation or
association so engaged in mining as aforesaid, for any
mine's product, then the said state board of equalization shall compute the gross value of such mine's product, and such gross value shall be based upon the average
quotations of the price of such mine's product in New
York City, or the relative market value at the point of
delivery, as evidenced by some established authority or
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market report, such as the Engineering and Mining
.T ournal of New York City, or some other standard publication, giving the market reports for the year covered
by the statement; and, provided further, that if any such
person, corporation, or association has sold or otherwise
disposed of any of its mine's product at a price substantially below the true market price of such product at
the time and place of such sale or disposal, then the
state board of equalization shall compute the gross value
of such portion of said Mine's product, so sold or disposed of substantially below the market price as aforesaid, which gross value shall be based upon the quotations
of the price of such mine's product in New York City,
or the relative market value at the point of delivery at
the time such portion of the product was so sold or otherwise disposed of, as evidenced by some established authority or market report, such as the Engineering and
Mining Journal, of New York City, or some other standard publication giving the market reports for the year
covered by such statement. Should there be no quotation
covering any particular product, then the state board
of equalization shall fix the value of such gross product,
or such portion thereof, as shall have been sold or otherwise disposed of at a priee substantially below the true
mark~t price at the time and place of such sale or disposal in sueh mann PI' aR may seem to he equitable."
In the case of State ex rel Snidow et al. v State
Board of Equalization, ct al, 93 Mont. 19, 25, 17 P. 2d 68,
77, the Court had hefore it the Montana Occupation or
License Tax statutes. Comparison of Sec. 2090.4 hereini

above quoted, with Sec 3 of the License Tax Act, as
quoted by the Court in that case at page 71 of 17 P. 2d,
shows that for the ascertainment of ''gross value of
product'' exactly the same yard stick is used as in the
Net Proceeds statute, and in our opinion the same thing
is true in this state. In general the case holds that the
market value of the ores is to be ascertained. not by taking
the pounds and ounces of metals produced and multiplying the same by the New York prices for metals for
the preceding year, but that the market value in Montana
is to he found by taking the New York quotations and
allowing certain differentials or deductions; in other
words, that the words "based upon" in the statute means
that differentials must be permitted in order to find the
market value in Montana. And the Court also held that
the Board of Equalization had been in error in permitting
the use of East St. Louis quotation of market prices for
zinc to ascertain the market price in Montana, and this
for the reason that the statute clearly provided for the
use of New York quotations. We are unable to understand why appellants cite this case unless it is for the
purpose of proving that Montana followed the correct
rule of statutory construction and held that their statute
meant what it said. So far as we• kn(rw no Mo-,Jtana case
has departed from that rule.
We make no contention that the statutes of Montana
and those of Utah are exactly alike. The Montana statute,
as appellants point out, requires ascertainment of the
market value (in Montana) based upon the average quotations of the price of such mine's product in New York

8

City; the Utah statute says nothing about quotations at
New York City, or any other place. However, as a matter
of fact, and this is common knowledge in the industry, ore
sales in Utah are based upon New York quotations for all
metals except zinc which is subject to quotations at East
St. Louis, all as quoted in the Engineering and Mining
.Journal. There is no substantial difference in the result
attained under either statute.
Appellants' brief does not clearly state what distinction is claimed; certainly it does not advance any reason
why this court should not do the same thing as the Montana court did and adhere to the plain meaning and intent
of the law as enacted by the legislature.
Our statute provides:
Sec. 80-5-57, U. C. A. 1943-The words, "net annual
proceeds,'' of a metalliferous mine or mining claim are
defined to be the gross proceeds realized during the preceding calendar year from the sale or conversion into
money or its equivalent of all ores from such mine or
mining claim extracted by the owner or lessee, contractor or other person working upon or operating the
property, including ,all dumps and tailings, during or
previous to the year for which the assessment is made,
less the following, and no other, deductions: • • • ''
If there be eliminated from the above words "or
conversion into money or its equivalent,'' it could hardly
be contended that a bona fide sale of ore by a producer
to a mill or smelt~r did not meet the exact terms of the
statute. Does the inclusion of those words permit of a
construction that what was meant was that two or more
9

standards were fixed: Or does it mean that conversion
into money or its equivalent must meet the same standard
as would be reached by a sale. If the former is true,
then the statute would be unconstitutional as lacking uniformity, and if the latter, it would not be. Moreover,
different operators were assigned different quotas upon
which payment of subsidies was based, and the subsidies
themselves varied, being A, or A and B, or A, B and C,
as the Quota Committee might determine. The result of
including the subsidy payments in net proceeds for the
tax base would be we would have no standard at all-all
of which is pointed out in Klies v. Linnane.
We think the Five Per Cent cases decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States, March 3, 1884 (110
U.S. 471, 28 L. Ed. 198), announce principles which can
be safely followed in answering the question here involved. Congress had enter,ed into compacts with each
of some nineteen western and southern states whereby
five per cent of the net proceeds of public lands lying
within the states respectively, and afterwards sold by
Congress, should be reserved and appropriated for the
benefit of the respective states. The question there was
whether lands disposed of by the United States in satisfaction of military grants were lands sold within the
meaning of the compacts, and the court held they were
not. We quote :
''A sale, in the ordinary sense of the word,
is a transfer of property for a fixed price in
money or its equivalent. \Vhen property or money
is transferred or paid as a compensation for
service, the property or money may be said to be
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the price of the service; but it can hardly be said
that the service is the price of the property or
money, or that the property or money is sold to
the person performing the service. Nor can it
be said that the pay of an officer or soldier in
the army or navy is sold to him by the government in consideration of a price paid by him.
"Land or money, other than current s·alary
or pay, granted by the government to a person
entering the military or naval service of the country, has always been called a bounty; and, while
it is by no means a gratuity, because the promise
to grant it is one of the considerations for which
the soldier or sailor enters the service, yet it is
clearly distinguishable from salary or pay measured by the time of service. For example, it was
held by Lord Mansfield and the Court of King's
Bench in 1784, that though the master of an apprentice was entitled by the act of Parliament of
2 & 3 Anne, ch. 6, s. 17, to the wages of his apprentice enlisting into the navy, yet the apprentice's share of prize money belonged to himself,
and not to his master, because it was not wages,
but the bounty of the crown. Garson v. Watts, 3
Doug. 350; Eades v. Candeput, 4 Doug. 1. Upon
like grounds, it has been held that bounty money
paid by the United States, or by a state, city or
town, upon the enlistment of a minor as a soldier,
during the recent war, belonged to him, and not
to his father or master. Banks v. Conant, 14 Allen,
497; Kelly v. Sprout, 97 Mass. 169. See also
Alexander v. \VPllington, 2 Russ & Myl. 35, 56, 64.

• • • •
''The question before us is not whether the
promise by the government of a bounty in land
or n:oney to persons entering the military service
is a contract for valuable consideration; but
11

whether, when carried into effect, it constitutes
a sale by the government; and it is quite clear
that land granted by way of reward for military
services has never been treated, in the legislation
of the United States upon the subject, as sold, but
has always been considered as analogous to money
paid in a gross sum by way of bounty.

• • • •
''From the very beginning of our existencr
as a nation, the reward of military service has
been treated as a national object and a public use,
to which the national domain might justly and
lawfully be applied. As new states have been successively formed out of the territory of the United
States, and admitted into the Union, the acts of
admission have reserved, for the making of public
highways and other public uses of the State, a
twentieth part of the net proceeds of public lands
lying within the State, and afterwards sold by the
United States. But public lands taken upon military land warrants issued under general laws,
passed for the national object of encouraging and
rewarding military service, and not limited to any
particular State, have no more been regarded as
lands sold, for any portion of the value of which
the national government should account to the
State in which the lands are actually taken up,
than lands reserved and used for forts, arsenals
or lighthouses.''
In the case of Luke v East Vulture Mining Company
(Arizona, March 2, 1936), 54 P. 2d 1002, the court construed the Arizona privilege tax ( Ch. 77, Laws of 1935)
of 1 per centum upon the gross proceeds of sales or gross
income from the business of mining, etc. Section 7, article 2 of said chapter exempted from the tax ''any sales
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made to the United States Government." Notwithstanding this express exemption the Tax Commission laid the
tax on the mining company in relation to dispositions of
gold and silv-er to the United States, claiming that because such disposition was required by Federal law and
was thus a ''forced sale'' the exemption was not allowable. The situation was somewhat the reverse of our
situation. The court said (p. 1003 column Pac. Rep.}"We conclude that, even though the disposition of gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates
by the owner can be made to the United States
only, and upon terms and conditions fixed by the
United States, such a transaction, when acquiesced
in by the owner, is a sale within the meaning of
said section 7, supra. The fact that it is a forced
sale does not make it any the less a sale." (Our
emphasis.)
Appellants argue also that the statutory definition
·of net proceeds includes income from any and all sources,
and they devote a great de·al of space in their bri·ef to
income tax cases and to prove that subsidies, bonuses
and gifts are a part of gross income under income tax
statutes. (Brief 16-17, 21-23). They cite such cases as
State v Illinois Central R. Co., 246 Ill. 188, 92 N. E. 814,
where the words "g-ross receipts" used in a statute imposing a tax of 7'1o on ''gross receipts'' were defined as
the "·entire amount, the total ·sum, without deduction of
any kind." They quote Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
v Roulliard, ________________________________ N. H, ________________________________ , 24
Atl. 2d 264, where under a statute imposing a tax of 2%
upon ''gross premiums received,'' the word ''gross'' was
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defined to mean the "whole; entire, total without deduction.'' They refer to other cases construing such words
as "gross earnings" and "income." (Brief 14-15.)
We think such arguments and references contribute
nothing to a solution of our problem. Our legislature
could have used such phrases a·s ''income,'' ''gross earnings, " "gross receipts" or "gross premiurns, " or words
of similar import, but it chose not to do so and limited the
definition of ''Net proceeds'' to the words, wi·th the restrictions and subject to the deductions contained in the
Utah Statutes.
There is no mystery as to the character or purpose
of subsidy, premium, bounty or bonus payments; such
payments have long been made under various conditions.
In 8 Am. J ur.>"" 824, it is said:
j
"Bounties are usually offered by some gov/ ernment unit, and necessarily for a public pur: pose. In this limited sense, then, a bounty is
ordinarily money offered by a government, to any
member of the public who will in the future render
a specified service to the public, either by the
performance of acts, or by the investment of time
and money in a project benefiting the public. * * *
Within this definition, bounties are not pure
gratuities, inasmuch as their payment, while
neither salary nor wages for the work performed
or obligations assumed, is one of the considerations for such performance or assumption."
In passing we note appellants' apparent desire that
the words ''gross proceeds realized'' be kept in mind and
that the significant modifying phrase ''from the sale or
conversiOn into money or its equivalent" be forgotten;
14

although the authorities they cite are all to the effect that
all the words of a statute must be taken into consideration in construing it, and yet they say (p. 33), "The exclusion of the premium payments from the computation
of net proceeds would effectuate a great wrong and would
do violence to the normal, natural meaning of the words
of the statute."

'Ve think the function of this court is to construe
the statute as written, and that if so construed it effectuates a great wrong, the remedy lies with the legislature, and in this connection we remark that we have had
two regular and some special sessions of our lawmakers
since this question became current and they have done
nothing about it. And it is at least a novel idea that it is
neccessary to leave out part of the words of a statute
in order not to do violence to the normal, natural meaning
of the words.
As to ''free and open markets,'' not alone metal
markets felt the impact of the Federal laws and regulations; it need hardly be suggested that our whole eoonomic structure was affected. Logically, it seems to us,
the Tax Commission might just as well try to collect
sales tax from us on the basis of what the market might
have been, or that landlords pay income tax on the basis
of what rentals they might have collected, except for the
regulations, as to try and include the premium metal payments. Here again we have a question of economics which
is for the legislature and not the court to deal with.
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II.
Paragraph 15 of respondent's complaint is as follows:
15. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the
United States empowers Congress to declare and
prosecute war, and Section 10 of the same article
denies such power to the states, and the laying and
collection by defendants of the tax on the subsidy
payments made by authority of Congress to plaintiff
was and is a substantial interference with the functions of the national government in the exercise of
such powers ; and the laying and collection of such
tax was and is wholly without authority under the
constitution and laws of the State of Utah, or otherwise, or at all, and is an arbitrary usurpation of
power and a taking of plaintiff's property without
due process of law in violation of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amednment to the Constitution of the
United States and of Section 7 of Article l of the
Constitution of the St,ate of Utah.
This paragraph raises a number of constitutional
questions both Federal and State and appellants devote
pages 33-37 of their brief to a discussion of these questions as they apprehend them. \V e do not agree that
they have discussed all of the questions or that the authorities they have cited are in point. We think the
principal question rajsed by our allegation is whether
in the cirmcumst,ances here it may be said that the effort
to tax premium payments results in an interference with
the power of Congress to declare and prosecute war.
The writer has been unable to find any case in point on
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that question. However, we do not desire to wari.ve the
constitutional questions involved by not arguing them
here more at length.
In our opinion the judgment of the lower court was
right and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HERBERT VAN DAM,
Attorney_ for Respondent
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